ForSEI untuk Ekonomi Islam dan Umat

Tak terasa ForSEI hampir menginjak usia 12 tahun, usia yang sudah tak muda lagi bagi sebuah forum ilmiyah. Tapi bertambahnya usia ini tidak sama dengan apa yang dirasakan manusia ketika mengalami pertambahan usia, yang seiring bertambahnya usia maka berkurang pula waktunya untuk hidup. Akan tetapi perpanjangan usia ini menandakan akan kemapanan ForSEI dan kontribusinya bagi ekonomi Islam serta umat.

            Berbicara tentang kontribusi, ya memang hal ini merupakan sebuah tolak ukur dari keberadaan sebuah forum atau organisasi, apalagi organisasi tersebut bergerak pada aktivitas nirlaba. Hal ini memang menjadi sebuah pertanyaan besar terutama bagi ForSEI, selama 12 tahun keberadaan ForSEI di tengah mahasiswa dan masyarakat, hal apa yang sudah ForSEI lakukan untuk berkontribusi dalam mengembangkan Ekonomi Islam serta membantu mengatasi masalah ekonomi Indonesia.

            Namun di sini saya tidak akan membahas bagaimana kontribusi ForSEI dalam membantu mengatasi masalah ekonomi Indonesia, karena masalah tersebut merupakan wilayah bagi mereka yang menduduki jabatan di kursi negara. Tapi di sini saya akan lebih membahas bagaimana kontribusi ForSEI dalam mengembangkan sistem Ekonomi Islam di Indonesia, khususnya dalam mempersiapkan mereka yang nantinya akan menjadi pejuang-pejuang Ekonomi Islam di masa depan.

            Keberadaan ForSEI dinilai sangat diharapkan untuk membantu memfasilitasi mereka para calon pejuang Ekonomi Islam, khususnya yang berada di sekitar kampus UIN Sunan Kalijaga. Sehingga seharusnya tujuan dari program-program ForSEI tersebut, bukanlah untuk membesarkan kader-kader yang berada di dalamnya, tetapi program-program tersebut bertujuan untuk menyiapkan seluruh stake holder Ekonomi Islam di sekitar kampus UIN Suka ini.

            Satu gagasan dari saya, ForSEI ada bukan untuk mereka yang berada pada barisan depan ForSEI, ForSEI ada bukan untuk membesarkan nama ForSEI, ForSEI ada bukan untuk membesarkan para kadernya. Tapi ForSEI ada untuk Ekonomi Islam, ForSEI ada untuk umat, ForSEI ada untuk mereka yang akan menjadi gerakan pembebas kesenjangan sosial. Semoga gagasan ini bisa kita jadikan semangat dam keyakinan bahwa Ekonomi Islam bukanlah sebuah alternatif, tapi Ekonomi Islam adalah sebuah solusi konkrit bagi perekonomian yang sudah terlanjur hancur.

a

UPAYA PENGUATAN RUPIAH DI SEKTOR PERDAGANGAN DAN JASA

Semakin hari nilai mata uang rupiah terhadap mata uang dollar semakin melemah, hal ini ditandai dengan semakin defisitnya transaksi berjalan indonesia, sehingga kebutuhan terhadap mata uang dollar pun semakin meningkat.

Upaya penguatan rupiah pun telah banyak dilakukan, salah satunya yaitu mewajibkan setiap transaksi domestik di pasar modern agar menggunakan mata uang rupiah. Direktur jendral perdagangan dalam negeri kementrian perdagangan Sri Agustina menegeskan bahwa “Transaksi barang dan jasa di pusat perbelanaan modern di dalam negeri, wajib menggunakan mata uang rupiah. Praktik penggunaan valuta asing dalam berbagai transaksi di pasar domestik bertentangan dengan Undang-undang Nomor 7 Tahun 2011tentang Mata Uang.

Sri juga menegaskan bahwa, ada dua peraturan Menteri Perdagangan yang secara tegas menyebut dan mengatur transaksi menggunakan mata uang rupiah. Kedua peraturan tersebut yaitu Permendag No. 70/2013 tentang Pedoman Penataan dan Pembinaan Pasar Tradisional, Pusat Perbelanjaan, dan Toko Modern serta Permendag No. 35/2013 tentang Pencamtuman Harga Barang dan Tarif  Jasa yang Diperdagangkan.

Pasal 12 Permendag No. 70/2013 menyebutkan, biaya sewa yang disebutkan dalam perjanjian sewa-menyewa harus dinyatakan dalam mata uang rupiah. Adapun pasal 6 (1) Permendag No. 35/2013 mengatur sanksi bagi pelaku usaha dan dan pasal 6 (2) mengatur penetapan harga barang atau tarif jasa yang harus menggunakan mata uang rupiah.

Dampak yang ditimbulkan dari adanya transaksi yang menggunakan valuta asing ini sangat mempengaruhi kinerja pasar domestik. Menurut Sofjan Wanandi (ketuan Aspindo), penggunaan valuta asing dalam transaksi di pasa domestik tidak hanya membuat nilai tukar rupiah gampang berfluktuasi, tetapi juga membebani dunia usaha. “Fluktuasi kurs rupiah terhadap valuta asing seperti dollar AS membuat pengusaha ritel kewalahan membayar sewa ruang di pusat-pusat perbelanjaan”, kata sofjan.

            Ketua Bidang Ritel Apindo Eddy Hartono mengatakan, hampir 60% mal di Jakarta menerapkan tarif sewa dalam dollar AS. Hal ini memberatkan pengusaha ritel saat kurs berfluktuasi seperti sekarang. “kenaikan sewa tempat dengan tarif dalam dollar AS semakin memojokan ritel . fluktuasi kurs rupiah membuat sektor ritel semakin kewalahan setelah upah minimum dan tarif listrik naik,” kata Eddy.

            Melihat transaksi ekspor – impor tidak menggunakan kurs rupiah, seharusnya transaksi di pasar domestik sepenuhnya menggunakan mata uang rupiah, guna menjaga kestabilan nilai rupiah di pasar domestik.Semoga pemerintah bisa lebih tegas dalam menanggapi berbagai permasalahan transaksi yang berkaitan dengan nilai tukar rupiah, karena hal ini bisa mendorong upaya penguatan nilai tukar rupiah terhadap valuta asing.

Sumber :

Koran Kompas tanggal 24 desember 2013 hal. 18

Koran Kompas tanggal 21 desember 2013 hal. 17

Permendag no 70 dan 35 tahun 2013

MEKANISME PASAR ISLAM MENURUT MONZER KAHF

Monzer kahf mengangkat sebuah judul  besar yang cukup mewakili pemikirannya terkait struktur pasar islam tersebut, yaitu “kerjasama yang bebas”. Judul  tersebut mengandung dua tema yang cukup mewakili , yaitu semangat kerjasama dan kebebasan. Kemudian beliau juga menjelaskan sejauh mana peran pemerintah dalam melakukan intervensi terhadap pasar.

 1.   Kebebasan Ekonomi

Kebebasan ekonomi yang dimaksudkan oleh Monzer Kahf ini tidak sama dengan kebebasan yang dimaksudkan oleh Adam Smith. Kebebasan yang dimaksudkan oleh Monzer Kahf di sini yaitu lebih kepada pertanggung jawaban setiap individu kepada sang penciptanya.

Setiap manusia bebas untuk melakukan segala aktivitas ekonomi yang ia inginkan, namun yang perlu diingat adalah mereka harus mempertanggungjawabkan segala aktivitasnya di hadapan Allah SWT, sehingga kebebasan yang mereka dapatkan adalah kebebasan yang tida akan mengganggu kebebasan orang lain, atau kebebasan yang selalu berada dijalan Allah SWT.

2.      Kerjasama

Ekonomi Islam merupakan ekonomi yang bebas, tetapi kebebasannya ditunjukan lebih banyak dalam bentuk kerjasama daripada dalam bentuk kompetisi. Artinya segala aktivitas perekonomian lebih ditujukan kepada kesejahteraan bersama.

Jadi Islam mengajarkan bahwa berbuat baik kepada sesama adalam suatu keharusan bagi hambanya, supaya tidak terjadi kesenjangan di masyarakat.

3.      Keterlibatan Pemerintah dalam Pasar

Pada dasarnya pemerintah mengakuui bahwa harga terbentuk oleh keseimbangan dari tingkat permintaan dan penawaran, akan tetapi pemerintah mengantisispasi adanya prilaku dzolim yang dilakuakan oleh beberapa pihak dipasar, seperti Ikhtikar (monooli), Tadlis (penipuan),  Talaqqi rubban, dan sebagainya. Sehingga di sini pemerintah memiliki beberapa peran dalam melakuakn intervensi di pasar.

a.       Pemerintah berperan sebagai perencana, dan penata produksi dan distribusi

Maksudnya adalah bahwa pemerintah berperan dalam membuat sebuah aturan yang bertujuan agar terlaksananya mekanisme pasar yang sesuai. Serta pemerintah juga memiliki hak untuk mengambil alih produksi yang bertanggung jawab bagi kebutuhan hajat orang banyak.

b.      Pemerintah berperan sebagai Supervisor atau pengontrol

Pemerintah berperan sebagai supervisor memiliki beberapa tujuan

1. Meningkatkan pemenuhan tujuan negara secara efisien

2. Memelihara agar aturan-aturan permainan yang ditetapkan oleh Allah SWT bisa selalu didukung.

(Ditulis berdasarkan hasil Pemahaman dari buku Ekonom Islam yang ditulis oleh Monzer Kahf)

Unjuk Gigi Bank Syariah dalam AEC 2015 (1)

Tak lama lagi ASEAN akan menghadapi kawasan industri bebas, atau yang kita kenal dengan nama ASEAN Economic Comunity. Berbagai perdebatanpun  mulai bermunculan terkait keputusan Indonesia yang mengajukan percepatan AEC dari yang semula  direncanakan akan berlangsung pada tahun 2020 kemudian dipercepat menjadi tahun 2015 mendatang.

            Namun bagaimanapun juga nasi telah berubah menjadi bubur, siap tidak siap indonesia tetap harus menghadapi AEC tersebut, jika indonesia tidak segera berbenah dalam menyambut AEC tadi, maka kemungkinan besar pasar indonesia akan dikuasai oleh negara ASEAN lainnya, namun jika indonesia sanggup berbenah dan siap menyambut AEC tadi, maka bukan tidak mungkin Indonesia bisa menguasai industri di pasar ASEAN ini.

            Sebenarnya Indonesia berpotensi besar dalam menghadapi AEC tadi, terutama dalam industri keuangan syariah.  Bagaimana tidak, hampir total masyarakat  indonesia didominasi oleh masyarakat beragama Islam, sehingga dimungkinkan penguatan sektor keuangan syariah akan sangat diharapkan dalam penguatan iklim ekonomi Indonesia.

            Namun jika kita melihat market share lembaga keuangan syariah yang sangat populer ditengah masyarakat yaitu industri perbankan syariah yang hanya mencapa 4,4% dari total aset perbankan di indonesia, menunjukan bahwa sektor perbankan syariah sendiri masih belum diterima sepenuhnya oleh masyarakat indonesia yang mayoritas muslim tersebut.

Padahal jika kita melihat sejarah perjalanan perbankan syariah indonesia terutama pada saat terjadi  krisis yang sangat besar yang melanda indonesia, dimana saat itu perbankan syariah tetap tegak dan berhasil melalui masa-masa krisis tersebut tanpa harus melakukan  merger seperti bank-bank lain. Seharusnya hal ini bisa menjadi acuan bagi pemerintah untuk menjadikan perbankan syariah sebagai solusi terkait berbagai permasalahan perekonomian indonesia, khususnya dalam menyambut AEC 2015 tadi.

Semoga perbankan syariah bisa berkembang lebih pesat lagi, mengingat AEC tinggal menunggu satu tahun lagi. Kerena mengingat indonesia memiliki potensi yang sangat bear dalam menghadapi industri pasar bebas ASEAN tahun 2015 nanti,

Pesimistis Bank Syariah Indonesia

Sedikit skeptis dari diri saya pribadi terkait posisi perbankan syariah sebagai sistem alternatif yang dapat menyelesaikan berbagai permasalahan perekonomian indonesia. Benarkahkah perbankan syariah yang menjadi solusi perekonomian indonesia seperti yang sering disampaikan dalam setiap seminar2? atau mungkin pernyataan tersebut hanya pernyataan stereotif, yang berarti pernyataan yang dinyatakan hanya dalam forum forum perbankan syariah saja?

karena jika kita lihat, tidak pernah sistem perbankan syariah ini disentuh dalam perbincangan negara terkait penyelesaian perekonomian negara.

kita ambil contoh seperti kasus melemahnya nilai tukar rupiah, pemerintah dan BI malah sibuk untuk menaikkan Suku bunga acuan (BI Rate).
Padahal jika kita melihat sejarah perbankan syariah pada tahun 1997, yang pada saat itu diwakili oleh bank muamalat, yang bisa melewati masa krisis tanpa harus melakukan merger seperti bank bank lain..ini menandakan bahwa perbankan syariah sudah pantas menjadi solusi perekonomian indonesia , khususnya permasalahan moneter (perbankan).

Memahami Kebijakan Baru BI

REPUBLIKA, 03 Desember 2012 | Pidato Gubernur Bank Indonesia Darmin Nasution dalam Pertemuan Tahunan Perbankan pada 23 November memberikan angin segar dan menambah keyakinan akan kesiapan Indonesia menghadapi tantangan di tengah gejolak global. Lingkungan bisnis global yang belum juga kunjung membaik mendorong para pelaku bisnis mengedepankan besarnya permintaan domestik sebagai pendorong pertumbuhan ekonomi.

Dari sisi kredit, hal ini berarti semakin besarnya porsi kredit konsumtif karena tingginya pertumbuhan kredit pada tiga segmen pasar, yaitu kredit pemilikan rumah (KPR), kredit kendaraan bermotor (KKB), dan kartu kredit. Pertumbuhan yang terlalu cepat di tiga segmen ini, khususnya sejak September 2011, berpotensi  menimbulkan kerawanan pada perekonomian, seperti naiknya harga-harga properti, kendaraan bermotor, dan barang konsumtif lainnya, secara tidak wajar.

Kenaikan harga-harga barang tersebut yang didorong oleh kenaikan daya beli nyata masyarakat (genuine demand) merupakan hal yang wajar. Namun, kenaikan harga-harga yang lebih didorong oleh kenaikan kredit untuk membeli barang-barang tersebut sifatnya tidak genuinedan sangat berpotensi menimbulkan gelembung harga aset.

Gubernur BI secara tepat sekali mengantisipasi potensi risiko penggelembungan harga aset ini. Apabila tidak segera dicegah, dapat memicu ketidakstabilan makro dan sistem keuangan. Untuk hal inilah, Bapepam-LK dan BI menerapkan instrumen makroprudensial berupa pengaturan loan to value (LTV) serta down payment untuk KPR dan KKB pada Maret 2012. Pada saat itu, peraturan LTV dan down paymentbelum diberlakukan pada produk KPR dan KKB syariah. Dampaknya pada KPR dan KKB konvensional mulai terlihat pada melambatnya pertumbuhan. Sebaliknya, pertumbuhan KKB syariah menunjukkan percepatan pertumbuhan meskipun kenaikan KKB syariah jauh lebih kecil dibandingkan penurunan KKB konvensional. Sedangkan, KPR syariah belum terlihat peningkatan yang signifikan.

Perpindahan kredit konvensional ke pembiayaan syariah akibat adanya perbedaan pengaturan inilah yang diebut oleh Gubernur BI sebagai regulatory arbitrage. Pengaturan LTV dan down payment di kredit konvensional yang lebih ketat dibandingkan dengan pembiayaan syariah yang belum diatur saat itu akan menyebabkan tujuan makroprudensial tidak tercapai. Itu sebabnya, BI dan juga Bapepam-LK akan memberlakukan ketentuan LTV dan down payment untuk KPR dan KKB syariah.

Sepintas, kebijakan tersebut terasa membatasi pertumbuhan pembiayaan syariah yang selama beberapa bulan ini mulai memanfaatkan peluang bisnis akibat adanyaregulatory arbitrage. Namun, bila dicermati lebih baik, kebijakan ini merupakan terobosan cerdas yang akan menempatkan industri keuangan syariah pada posisi yang strategis dalam mengantisipasi gejolak ekonomi.

Pertama, regulatory arbitrage yang timbul dalam beberapa bulan ini tentunya telah diperhitungkan dengan matang oleh BI dan Bapepam- LK ketika mengeluarkan ketentuan LTV dan down payment pada Maret 2012. Kebijakan selalu bersifat dinamis, kadang bersifat ekspansi kadang bersifat kontraksi.
Atau, dalam bahasa Gubernur BI, "policy is an art rather than science".

Kedua, perlakuan yang sama atas LTV dan down payment bagi lembaga keuangan konvensional maupun lembaga keuangan syariah akan memberikan level of playing field yang sama. Bagi lembaga keuangan syariah, hal ini lebih baik dibandingkan dengan keadaan sebelum Maret 2012.

Sebelum pemberlakuan kebijakan yang dapat menimbulkan regulatory arbitrage pada Maret 2012 itu, lembaga keuangan konvensional lazim memberikan KKB dengandown payment lebih kecil dari 20 persen. Sedangkan, lembaga keuangan syariah lebih lazim memberlakukan down payment minimal 20 persen.

Pada periode itu, lembaga keuangan konvensional lebih kompetitif untuk melakukan ekspansi. Setelah Maret 2012, lembaga keuangan syariah lebih kompetitif untuk melakukan ekspansi. Dengan adanya kebijakan baru yang meng hilangkan arbitrage, daya kompetitif untuk ekspansi keduanya sama.

Ketiga, kebijakan baru BI mengaitkan down payment dengan penggunaan akad yang berbeda. KPR murabahah diberlakukan down payment yang sama dengan KPR konvensional. KPR musyarakah mutanaqisah (MMQ) dan ijarah diberlakukan down payment yang lebih ringan.

KPR mudarabah bahkan lebih ringan lagi perlakuan down payment-nya. Ada dua pesan penting dari multilayered down payment ini. Pertama, adanya antisipasi kenaikan tingkat suku bunga yang lebih mudah diakomodasi dengan akad-akad nonmurabahah. Kedua, antisipasi recovery risk untuk akad yang berbeda. Keempat, kebijakan multilayered down payment yang akan diberlakukan pada KPR ini dapat diduga akan diberlakukan pula terhadap KKB pada saatnya. Karakteristik risiko yang berbeda di masing-masing akad yang tepat di berlakukan pada KPR syariah sepatutnya diberlakukan pula pada KKB syariah untuk memberikan level of playing field yang sama. Risiko KKB konvensional sama dengan risiko KKB murabahah.

Namun, risiko KKB konvensional tidak sama identik dengan risiko KKB nonmurabahah, terutama recovery risk dan risiko perubahan bunga (interest rate risk). Untuk kedua jenis risiko ini, KKB nonmurabahah jauh lebih kecil dibanding KKB konvensional dan juga dibanding KKB murabahah. Pemberlakuan multilayered down payment untuk KKB syariah adalah upaya untuk menghindari regulatory arbitrage.

Upaya memberikan level of playing field yang sama bagi lembaga keuangan konvensional dan syariah atau dalam istilah Gubernur BI, upaya menghindariregulatory arbitrage, perlu terus dilakukan. Hal ini akan mempercepat terbukanya akses bagi seluruh lapisan masyarakat (inklusif), baik untuk produk keuangan konvensional maupun syariah.

Gubernur BI secara sangat tepat merumuskan "strong growth is not necessarily inclusive. But, inclusive growth is a more sustained and optimal growth".
Kemampuan perbankan syariah menjangkau pasar terbukti efektif. Dengan pangsa pasar aset yang hanya empat persen, bank syariah berhasil meraih 10 juta nasabah. Kemampuan inklusif ini patut dikembangkan terus dengan memberikan level of playing field yang sama. Survei Bank Dunia bahwa lebih dari setengah penduduk Indonesia belum terjamah akses keuangan formal merupakan tantangan lembaga keuangan konvensional dan syariah.

Kita patut bersyukur atas kejelian BI dan Bapepam-LK mengantisipasi tantangan di tengah gejolak ekonomi global. Kebijakan baru yang disampaikan pada Pertemuan Tahunan Perbankan itu merupakan kado berharga. Hanya dengan makro dan mikroprudensial, industri keuangan syariah akan tumbuh optimal dan berkesinambungan.

Letter of Intent IMF and Indonesia 1998

Jakarta, Indonesia

November 13, 1998Mr. Michel Camdessus

Managing Director

International Monetary Fund

Washington DC 20431

Dear Mr. Camdessus:

Steady progress continues to be made in implementing the Government of Indonesia’s economic program, supported under an extended arrangement from the Fund, and set out in the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of July 29 and in the Supplementary Memoranda of September 11 and October 19. In particular, there is increasing evidence that macrostability is being restored, and that the economy’s decline may finally be bottoming out.

We recognize, however, that the crucial challenge of moving from successful stabilization to sustainable growth still lies ahead. All our efforts are focused towards that end, and we are confident that our program will command widespread support in the community. We have taken a number of additional steps to implement the program, especially in the key areas of corporate and financial restructuring, which are described in the attached Supplementary Memorandum.

We have met the indicative targets for end-October 1998 on net domestic assets of Bank Indonesia and net international reserves of Bank Indonesia. Data are not yet available for the end-October 1998 indicative target relating to the central government balance.

We have set indicative targets on monetary, fiscal, and external variables for end-February 1999 consistent with those previously established for end-March 1999, and these are set out in the attached table. We have also set out revised structural performance criteria and benchmarks for the period through end-June 1999.

We request that the next three program reviews under the extended arrangement take place on a bi-monthly basis, with the first of these reviews to be completed by mid-February 1999. Quarterly reviews of the program would begin thereafter. We recognize that these revisions will require changes in the phasing of purchases under the arrangement and, in that context, we intend to request a rephasing of the arrangement at the time of the completion of the first bi-monthly review.

Sincerely yours,For the Government of Indonesia,/ s /

---

Ginandjar Kartasasmita

State Coordinating Minister

For Economy, Finance, and Industry

Jakarta, Indonesia

November 13, 1998

Indonesia

Supplementary Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies

1.  Further progress has been made over the past month in implementing the Government of Indonesia’s economic program, and there have been encouraging developments on a number of fronts. Progress has been most marked toward the restoration of macroeconomic stability, assisted by continued adherence to a firm monetary policy. The rupiah has generally strengthened toward a more realistic range, food prices have declined while the overall price level has stabilized, and there have been gains in the stock market. However, there continues to be considerable volatility in the exchange rate. In addition, output recovery is still not at hand, although production appears to be bottoming out.

2.  Against this background, the priority at this juncture is to hasten the recovery as much as possible, while extending the recent gains in macroeconomic stability. We have further developed the frameworks for banking and corporate restructuring, and intend to provide an adequate fiscal stimulus in the period immediately ahead that will better support domestic demand as well as augment the social safety net. The program continues to be developed in consultation with the IMF, World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (see Matrix).

I.  MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK AND POLICIES

Output, Prices, and Balance of Payments

3.  We have reviewed the macroeconomic framework for 1998/99 and begun discussions toward a framework that would underpin the 1999/2000 budget to be presented in early January. We are encouraged by the prospect that output could finally stabilize during the next one to two quarters and that modest growth could resume in mid-1999. On this basis, we expect the output decline for 1998 to be contained close to the program projection of 15 percent, and that the forthcoming budget could anticipate modest positive growth during 1999/2000. Indeed, some sectors are already showing tentative signs of a turnaround.

4.  Inflation has subsided, helped by the strengthening rupiah and improved food availability. The consumer price index declined in October and is now expected to be about unchanged or to show a very modest rise during the fourth quarter of 1998. Thus, average inflation for 1998 could be contained within the program assumption of 80 percent. During 1999, we expect inflation to fall toward 10 percent, close to the pre-crisis level.

5.  The careful management of BULOG’s operations has helped to stabilize the rice situation and improve overall output and price prospects. Retail and wholesale rice prices have declined by about 15 percent in most regions of the country since mid-September, despite reduced public sales. BULOG’s rice import needs from now until the main harvest in February-March are smaller than previously projected, because of improved domestic availability, and these have been mostly contracted. Thus, we are confident of maintaining rice price stability in the coming months. At the same time, we are working to support a substantial increase in the 1999 rice crop through improved availability of seeds, fertilizer, and credit. As part of our continuing effort to increase efficiency in rice distribution, the release price of third quality rice is being gradually brought closer to market levels, which should help to reduce the wide trade margin. The appreciation of the rupiah will allow the exchange rate subsidy for imports of rice by BULOG to be removed on December 31, 1998; the remaining subsidies on low quality rice will be provided explicitly through the budget.

6.  The overall balance of payments for 1998/99 is expected to show a surplus, rather than balance as indicated in the program. The external current account surplus will probably be above the program target (in the range of 4-5 percent of GPD), on account of weaker than expected import demand, although still substantially smaller in relation to GDP than in other Asian crisis countries. However, the capital account could be less favorable than programmed because of slightly lower disbursements of foreign assistance to the public sector. This would be consistent with the expected lower level of public spending (paragraph 10 below).

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy

7.  The conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy under the program has begun to deliver important results. Thus, we reaffirm our commitment to keep base money firmly under control so as to stabilize prices and accommodate a further appreciation of the rupiah.

8.  With the strengthening of the rupiah, the monetary policy framework allowed significant reductions of short-term money market rates in October and early November, and we see considerable room for further reductions in the weeks ahead. The interest rate structure of commercial banks has continued to come down, and spreads between deposit and lending rates are beginning to normalize. In addition, we continue to make progress with lengthening the maturity structure of monetary instruments.

9.  We will continue to be guided by the agreed quantitative monetary program for 1998/99. Net domestic assets of the Bank Indonesia (BI), net international reserves, base money, and liquidity support were all within the indicative targets for end-October. The program allows base money to grow by up to about 6 percent during the last quarter of 1998 and about 4.5 percent during the first quarter of 1999, providing scope for strengthening confidence to be reflected in reserve increases and the monetary aggregates. Of course, monetary policy will remain flexible and be tightened if renewed dangers arise to exchange rate stability, or eased if circumstances warrant.

Fiscal Policy, Development Spending, and Social Safety Net

10.  Fiscal developments have been carefully reviewed, focusing on the adequacy of the fiscal stimulus, the social safety net, the institutional framework for development spending, and the privatization program. Based on the measures outlined in the MEFP of October 19, we expect development expenditure (which was only 21 percent of the annual budget in the first half year), to rise sharply during the second half of this fiscal year, providing a key stimulus to domestic demand and strengthening the social safety net. Nevertheless, because of the delayed start in development spending, total expenditure will likely fall below the revised 1998/99 budget projection under the program. In addition, the budget outcome will benefit somewhat from the recent strengthening of the rupiah. Both factors will help offset emerging shortfalls in privatization proceeds, while also containing the budget deficit to about 6 percent of GDP for 1998/99 as a whole, below the program target of 8.5 percent of GDP.

11.  Our concern for accelerating development expenditure is tempered by the importance of ensuring that budgetary resources reach the intended beneficiaries. In this context, we are seeking the collaboration of provincial governments, civil society, and non-governmental organizations at all levels, and are stepping up internal government oversight mechanisms, to help identify leakages, and ensure accountability. In addition to better monitoring, we will adjust the regional and program composition of social safety net expenditures in light of information on the regional impact of the crisis and the success rate of different anti-poverty programs. On November 3, a Presidential decree was issued to form a high-level ministerial task force, as well as a monitoring team led by a distinguished member of civil society to supervise and coordinate implementation of these programs. They are expected to make specific proposals by end-December.

12.  We are also working closely with the World Bank to ensure that subsidies and social safety net programs are better targeted to the poorest groups. The targeted subsidized rice scheme reached six million families by end-October and will be substantially expanded in the coming months. We intend to increase monthly allocations under the scheme from 10 kilograms to 20 kilograms per family, effective December 1. As a step toward reducing the untargeted subsidies in the energy area, we will raise aviation fuel prices to international levels on January 1, 1999.

13.  We have commenced preparation for the 1999/2000 central government budget. At this stage, it is our intention to ensure that fiscal stimulus is maintained through the next fiscal year. High priority will be attached to social safety net spending, while untargeted subsidies are phased down. We plan to frontload expenditures into the first semester of 1999/2000, so as to give maximum support to domestic demand in the period immediately ahead. The 1999/2000 budget will include the interest costs of the bonds that will be issued to cover the costs of bank restructuring. These costs will be higher than the budgeted restructuring costs of this year and will be estimated in detail in early December, in consultation with the IMF.

II.  PRIVATIZATION AND STATE ENTERPRISE AUDITS

14.  The privatization program for the current fiscal year is broadly proceeding as envisaged in the MEFP of October 19, although some further slippages into the next fiscal year are still possible. As before, we are focusing on selling, by end-March 1999, majority interests in the Jakarta container port, as well as minority interests in Jakarta airport operations, the largest palm oil plantation in Indonesia, and the international telecommunication enterprise. To support the sale of the international telecommunication concern, we intend to introduce into Parliament by end-December a new telecommunications law covering all aspects of regulation and competition. Care will be taken to ensure that contract design and bidding procedures follow international best practice and that complete transparency is maintained throughout the privatization process. We are committed to divest at least two state enterprises by end-February 1999.

15.  The masterplan for the restructuring and privatization of all state enterprises over the medium term, has been adopted and publicly released. The masterplan also provides for the review of the regulatory framework in the key privatized sectors. Except for a specified short list, the program calls for all of the present 150 state enterprises to be divested over the next decade. Details of companies to be privatized during 1999-2001 are included in the plan, focusing on hotels, trading, construction, mining, and civil engineering firms, and fertilizer producers. In the meantime, enterprise efficiency will be improved through greater management autonomy, enhanced competition, hard budget constraints, and the phased elimination of preferential access to bank credit (by end-March 2000). Companies to be restructured during this period for later privatization include the state electricity corporation and the national airline.

16.  We are taking steps to fulfill our commitment to release detailed financial information on BULOG, Pertamina, the state electricity corporation (PLN), and the reforestation fund. In the case of PLN, international standard audits have already been completed for each of the past three financial years and are being made available to the IMF, World Bank, and AsDB. For the other three institutions, we believe that it would be more useful to audit the accounts for the 1998/99 financial year (which ends in March) rather than completing the audits by end-December. Auditors in each case will be appointed by end-November and the tasks will be completed no later than end-June 1999. For Pertamina, we are providing IMF and World Bank staff a recent performance audit completed by international consultants. We also intend to extend the audit process to other key public entities with substantial market or debt exposure.

III.  BANKING SECTOR REFORMS

17.  The focus of our reform strategy remains as described in the MEFP of October 19. The immediate priority is to proceed, with maximum efficiency, in the following areas:

(I) press ahead with recapitalizing viable private banks; (ii) achieve final resolution of the 14 banks taken over or frozen in April and August, as well as of the other banks under the control of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA); (iii) finalize agreements with former bank owners for the repayment of obligations owed to the Government; (iv) advance the merger of four state banks into the newly established Bank Mandiri; and (v) issue key laws and prudential regulations. Structural benchmarks are shown in the attached table.

18.  Toward implementing the recapitalization program for private banks, all banks will soon have been classified according to their capital adequacy ratio which is a key determinant for participation in the program. The next stages in the program are as follows:

  First, business plans will need to be submitted by banks in order for a judgment to be made on their viability, and must include an agreed plan for the settlement of related party lending by the owners. Already, 69 privately owned banks, for which independent reviews or BI examinations have been completed, have been invited to submit business plans for this purpose. This process will be extended to the remaining private and regional banks, and two state banks (BNI and BRI), as well as to the banks taken over by IBRA, provided they meet all the conditions.

  Second, the business plans will be evaluated and approved by review committees, that will include representatives from BI, the Ministry of Finance, IBRA, and independent observers (from the World Bank, AsDB, and IMF), on the basis of agreed criteria.

  Third, banks with approved plans and which meet the other prescribed conditions will be recapitalized, after existing shareholder equity has been written down commensurately with adequate provisioning for non-performing loans and other assets. The Government’s contribution to the recapitalization (up to 80 percent) will be in the form of long-term bonds, including both market-linked and indexed bonds. Alternative resolution strategies will be implemented by January 31, 1999 for banks unwilling or unable to participate in recapitalization or for banks with rejected business plans, including mergers or closure by Bank Indonesia.
19.  The above framework for the bank recapitalization program will be put in place very quickly. The committees will be established by mid-November; the criteria finalized shortly thereafter; and bond issues initiated by end-December. It is expected that, by end-January 1999, a first group of eligible banks will be recapitalized to at least a 4 percent capital adequacy ratio.
20.  Rapid progress is also being made toward resolving the banks taken over by IBRA:

  The liquidation process for the 10 banks frozen in April and August is at an advanced stage: (I) their asset transfer to IBRA’s Asset Management Unit (AMU) will be completed, as scheduled, by end-November; (ii) the AMU is to undertake a complete inventory of these assets and, by end-year, develop plans for managing and realizing their maximum value; and (iii) the revocation of their licenses will be done by end-December 1998.

  Regarding the four banks taken over by IBRA, but still operating (BCA, Danamon, PDFCI, and Tiara), decisions on resolving their status have been delayed pending completion of negotiations by IBRA with the former owners on the repayment and settlement of connected lending. The outstanding issues are nearing resolution, helped by the enactment of the amendments to the Banking Law, and the agreements with owners on repayment terms (see below).

  On November 6, final agreement was reached with the former owners of four banks (BCA, Danamon, BDNI, and Surya) and the part-owner of BUN on the terms of repayment of obligations owed to the Government (repayment over four years, with a 27 percent cash component in the first year, with interest on the outstanding balances). Now that these terms have been clarified, the Government is committed to applying them consistently and transparently in negotiations with the owners of a further six similarly indebted banks. Discussions have resumed between IBRA and the former owners of these banks, and final agreements are expected, in at least four cases, by end-November, and in all cases, by end-December 1998.
21.  The merger of the four previously separate state banks into the newly formed Bank Mandiri (comprising 30 percent of the deposit base of the banking system) is proceeding satisfactorily, with assistance from a major international bank under a management and operational restructuring contract. Already, highly respected officials have been appointed to head the Board of Commissioners and the Board of Directors of the bank. A preliminary corporate plan has been developed which focuses initially on centralizing control of credit risk management and trading operations. A consolidated balance sheet will be prepared by December 31, 1998 providing the basis for the transfer of non-performing assets to the AMU.
22.  Meanwhile, we are moving ahead with strengthening the regulatory and prudential framework for the banking system. A draft central bank law providing for independence of Bank Indonesia will be introduced into Parliament by end-December 1998. The banking law has been recently amended by Parliament and has entered into force, following its signature by the President; it permits major improvements in the areas of bank licensing and ownership, openness to foreign direct investment, bank secrecy, and empowerment of IBRA. New prudential regulations governing loan classification, loan loss provisioning and the treatment of debt restructuring operations will be issued by mid-November and regulations related to liquidity management and foreign currency exposure by end-November. A further three regulations on connected lending, the capital adequacy ratio, and the semi-annual publication of financial statements will be issued by December 15. We will shortly issue implementing regulations for the full functioning of IBRA and, at the next program review, we will assess the adequacy of provisions relating to debt equity conversions and liability provisions in the banking law.
IV.  CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND BANKRUPTCY REFORM 23.  Efforts to implement the Jakarta Initiative announced on September 9, 1998, have intensified. The Jakarta Initiative Task Force is becoming fully operational, and its staffing and facilities should be greatly enhanced by end-December, with the help of a planned World Bank Corporate Restructuring Technical Assistance Loan. A conference on the Jakarta Initiative, co-sponsored by the World Bank, was held in early November, and has helped to increase public understanding of the Initiative and the role of the Task Force, with many participants endorsing the underlying framework.
24.  The Initiative is beginning to produce results. Twenty-five companies with a combined debt of about $5 billion have sought assistance from the task force for initiating their debt renegotiations and corporate restructuring. Negotiations between some debtors and creditors have already begun. We envisage that the number of negotiations will increase rapidly in the coming months, especially as firms attempt to obtain an exchange rate risk guarantee under INDRA (the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency) ahead of the June 1999 deadline.
25.  Meanwhile, the necessary legal and regulatory changes to overcome obstacles for corporate restructuring are being completed. A government regulation providing for tax neutrality for mergers and other reorganizations and removing certain other identified tax disincentives for restructuring was signed on October 30. A regulation under the company law to remove obstacles to debt-to-equity conversion is in the final stages of preparation and will be signed by end-November. A review of the legal changes needed to create an effective and predictable system for security rights is being undertaken and a public registry system is planned to be initiated by end-December, with AsDB assistance. The one-stop regulatory facilitation process for filings related to restructuring arrangements will be put in place by mid-December.
26.  In light of the Jakarta Initiative, effective bankruptcy law reform and implementation has taken on additional significance. Now that the commercial court, which exercises jurisdiction in bankruptcy matters, is operational, attention is being focused on the establishment of a transparent court fee system, the mechanism for the appointment of ad hoc judges to assist the court as provided for in the bankruptcy law, and the effective enforcement of court orders. Measures in the first two of these are expected to be in place by end-December. Additional training courses for judges of the Commercial Court are being organized.
V.  FOREIGN EXCHANGE MONITORING SYSTEM 27.  Since the last review, further progress has been made in the development of a foreign exchange monitoring system. Bank Indonesia is preparing a regulation requiring banks to report daily their sales and purchases in the exchange market, in a prescribed format. This system should enable BI to monitor foreign exchange flows on a more timely basis than is possible with existing data collection systems. BI is undertaking a thorough review of its current balance of payments data collection system, with IMF technical assistance, before the new system is put into place. As before, we remain committed to a free foreign exchange system, without surrender or repatriation requirements or capital controls.

Table 1. Indonesia: Performance Criteria and Indicative Targets Under Extended Arrangement, September 1998-February 1999
	1998						1999
	Sep.			Targets
	Target	Adjusted	Actual	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.	Feb.
Monetary Targets
Net domestic  assets of Bank Indonesia2	-67.5	-55.4	-70.1	-61.7	-56.2	-50.9	-52.0	-53.2
Base money2	69.7	69.7	69.9	71.5	73.0	74.3	75.4	76.5
Liquidity support2	173.1	176.4	177.7	173.6	174.1	174.6	174.8	174.9
Fiscal Targets
Overall central government balance3	-30.0	. . .	. . .	-37.0	-44.0	-51.0	-64.1	-72.7
External Targets
Net international reserves of Bank Indonesia4	13.7	12.5	14.0	13.3	12.9	12.5	12.7	13.0
Contracting  or  guaranteeing  of  new  external  debt 5	5.5	5.5	. . .	. . .	. . .	7.5	. . .	. . .
Stock  of  short-term  external  debt  outstanding 2	2.5	2.5	. . .	. . .	. . .	2.5	. . .	. . .
Memorandum items:
Balance of payments support6	4.7	. . .	3.6	5.5	6.3	7.3	8.4	9.5
Reserve liabilities6	4.9	. . .	2.9	5.8	6.8	6.8	7.1	7.4
1Definitions of quantitative performance criteria and indicative targets are contained in Annexes A-D of EBS/98/130 of July 29, 1998. The end-September, and end-December 1998 data for net domestic assets, overall central government balance, net international reserves, the contracting of new external debt (original maturity greater than one year), and the stock of short-term external debt are performance criteria. The other figures are indicative targets for all variables.
2Outstanding stocks (program limits).
3Cumulative balances from end-March 1998 (floor).
4Outstanding stocks (floor).
5Cumulative amounts from end-March 1998 (ceilings).
6Cumulative flows from end-March 1998.

Table 2. Structural Performance Criteria and Benchmarks,
December 1998-June 1999¹² End-December 1998

• Reduce export taxes on logs and sawn timber to 20 percent.³
• Submit Central Bank law to Parliament.
• Finalize the evaluation of business plans for the first group of private banks currently under consideration for participation in the recapitalization program.
• Complete terms and conditions of bond issues for the bank restructuring process and start issuing bonds.

End-January 1999

• Recapitalize the first group of private banks.
• Finalize decision on the resolution of all banks that fail the criteria for eligibility to the recapitalization program.

End-February 1999

• Divest two state enterprises.

End-March 1999

• Complete divestiture of a total of at least four state enterprises.
• Prepare mechanism for the regular adjustment of administered prices.
• Establish centralized credit function and Treasury unit within Bank Mandiri.

End-June 1999

• Complete audits of Pertamina, BULOG, PLN, and Reforestation Fund. ²
• Achieve full operating integration of two banks into Bank Mandiri.

---

¹ Additional measures have been italicized.
² Primary responsibility between institutions are as follows: monetary and exchange rate policy—IMF; fiscal policy—IMF; bank restructuring--IMF/World Bank/AsDB; corporate debt restructuring—World Bank/IMF; trade policy and trade financing—World Bank; real sector structural reforms, privatization, and environment—World Bank/AsDB; social safety net—World Bank/AsDB; food security—World Bank; small and medium-size enterprises—AsDB; audits of state enterprises—World Bank.
³ Performance criterion.
 MATRIX
STRUCTURAL POLICY COMMITMENTS¹
New and Strengthened Commitments are Shown in Italics²

Policy Action	Target Date	Status
Fiscal Issues
Introduce second stage increase in excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco to reflect exchange rate and price developments.	July 1, 1998	Under review
Raise profit transfers to the budget from state enterprises, including Pertamina.	1998/99 and 1999/2000	Under preparation
Prepare mechanism for the regular adjustment of administered prices	April 1, 1999
Raise aviation fuel prices to international levels.	January 1, 1999
Accelerate provisions under the Nontax Revenue Law of May 1997, to require all off-budget funds to be incorporated in budget within three years.	Ongoing
Strengthen public expenditure management.	Over program period; first steps in July 1998	Two long-term IMF experts in place
Conduct revenue review with Fund assistance.	Over program period; first step by end-September 1998	Initiated. IMF mission visited in August 1998
Monetary and Banking Issues
Submit to Parliament a draft law to institutionalize Bank Indonesia’s autonomy.	September 30, 1998	Expected by end-December
Submit draft amendment to banking law to Parliament that would eliminate restrictions on foreign investments in listed banks, amend bank secrecy with regard to nonperforming loans and enable state bank mergers and privatization.	August 31, 1998	Approved by Parliament on October 16
Impose limits on and phase out BI credits to public agencies and public sector enterprises.	Ongoing
Strengthen Bank Indonesia’s bank supervision department and strengthen enforcement of regulations.	Ongoing
Establish program for divestiture of Bank Indonesia’s interests in private banks.	Ongoing
Eliminate all restrictions on bank lending except for prudential reasons or to support cooperatives or small scale enterprises.	Over program period
Bank Restructuring
Establish independent review committee to enhance transparency and credibility of IBRA operations.	June 30, 1998	Done. First meeting held in late October
Conduct portfolio, systems and financial reviews of all IBRA banks as well as major non-IBRA banks by internationally recognized audit firms.	August 30, 1998	Twenty-seven banks done. Remaining 27 banks to be completed by November 30
Conduct portfolio, systems, and financial reviews of all other domestic banks by internationally recognized audit firms.	October 31, 1998	Expected by end-December
Complete review by Bank Indonesia of business plans of the first group of private banks.	November 30, 1998	Expected by end-November
Recapitalize first group of banks which qualify for the recapitalization program.	January 31, 1999
Complete terms and conditions of recapitalization bond issues.	December 31, 1998
Transfer nonperforming assets of the ten banks frozen in April and August to the asset management unit.	November 30, 1998	Done for six banks
Implement alternative resolution strategies for banks ineligible for the recapitalization scheme	January 31, 1999
Resolve 26 banks currently subject to IBRA control for which audits are expected to be completed by mid-November.	December 31, 1998
Issue government bonds to Bank Negara Indonesia at market-related terms to finance transfer of deposits of seven banks frozen in April.	July 31, 1998	Under preparation
Establish centralized control of lending decisions and treasury management in the four state banks that are being merged into Bank Mandiri.	March 31, 1999
Finalize blueprint for operational merger of four state banks.	December 31, 1998
Prepare state-owned banks for privatization.	2001
Reach financial settlement with former owners of two private banks for repayment of Bank Indonesia liquidity support.	October 29, 1998	Done on November 6 for five banks
Reach agreement with former owners of six other banks for repayment of Bank Indonesia liquidity support and connected lending	November 30, 1998
AMU to develop plans for managing assets	December 31, 1998
Issue three new prudential regulations on loan classification, loan loss provisions, and debt restructuring operations.	November 15, 1998	Expected to be done
Issue two new prudential regulations on liquidity management and foreign currency exposure.	November 30, 1998	On schedule
Issue three new prudential regulations on connected lending, the capital adequacy ratio, and the semi-annual publication of financial statements.	December 15, 1998	On schedule
Introduce deposit insurance scheme.	Program period
Corporate Restructuring and Bankruptcy Reform
Complete the necessary documentation for the Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA).	August 31, 1998	Done
Operationalize the Jakarta Initiative Task Force.	October 31, 1998	Done
Encourage the initiation of negotiations between debtors and creditors under the Jakarta Initiative.	November 30, 1998	Done
Remove restrictions on debt/equity conversions.	September 30, 1998	Expected by end-November
Provide for tax neutrality for mergers and other reorganizations	September 30, 1998	Done on October 30
Put in place one stop shop process for filings related to corporate restructuring agreements/	October 31, 1998	Expected by mid-December
Establish transparent court fee system for the Commercial Court	December 31, 1998
Establish mechanism for the appointment of ad hoc judges to the Commercial Court	December 31, 1998
Submit to Parliament a new arbitration law consistent with international standards.	December 31, 1998
Complete review of accounting and auditing standards for the purposes of making them consistent with international standards.	December 31, 1998
Introduce measures to provide for the registration of security interests.	December 31, 1998
Foreign Trade
Gradually reduce tariffs on nonfood agricultural products to a maximum of 10 percentage points.	2003
Reduce tariffs on chemical, steel/metal and fishery products to 5–10 percent.	2003
Phase out remaining quantitative import restrictions and other nontariff barriers.	End-program
Reduce export taxes on logs, sawn timber, rattan, and minerals to a maximum of 30 percent by April 15, 1998; 20 percent by end-December 1998, and 15 percent by end-December 1999 and 10 percent by end-December 2000.	First step by April 22, 1998	First step done
Phase in resource rent taxes on logs, sawn timber, rattan and minerals.	First step by April 22, 1998	First step done
Replace remaining export taxes and levies by resource rent taxes as appropriate.	Over program period
Eliminate all other export restrictions.	Over program period	Under preparation
Remove ban on palm oil exports and replace by export tax of 40 percent. The level of the tax will be reviewed regularly for possible reduction, based on market prices and the exchange rate and reduced to 10 percent by end-December 1999.	April 22, 1998	Done. Tax raised to 60 percent in July
Privatization and Public Enterprises
Divest 12 listed and unlisted enterprises announced for privatization in 1998/99.	March 31, 1999	Four or five enterprises likely to be divested
Prepare action plans for all public enterprises.	September 30, 1998	Done. Masterplan published in early November
Establish clear profit and performance targets for remaining government enterprises.	December 31, 1998	Under preparation
Audit nonviable public enterprises.	December 31, 1998	In progress
Complete international standard audits of Pertamina, PLN, BULOG, and the Reforestation Fund.	December 31, 1998	For completion by June 30, 1999
Social Safety Net
Introduce community-based work programs to sustain purchasing power of poor in both rural and urban areas.	FY1998/99	Underway with World Bank and Asian Development Bank
Introduce subsidized rice scheme to support 7.5 million very poor families.	Complete by October 1998	Six million families reached by end-October
Expand subsidized rice scheme and increase monthly allocations to 20 kilograms per family.	FY 1998/99	December 1, 1998
Eliminate exchange rate subsidies for rice imports by BULOG and replace by explicit budgetary subsidies.	December 31, 1998
Introduce micro credit scheme to assist small businesses.	FY1998/99	Ongoing
Environment
Draft and establish implementation rules for the new environmental law.	December 31, 1998	Under preparation
Accelerate programs for converting to cleaner fuels.	December 31, 1999	Under preparation
Auction forest concessions, and lengthen concession periods.	June 30, 1998	Agreement not yet reached with World Bank
Allow transferability of forestry concessions, and eliminate the requirement for concessionaires to own processing facilities.	June 30, 1998	Under review by World Bank
Implement performance bonds and reduce land conversion targets to environmentally sustainable levels.	December 31, 1998
Other
Appoint auditors as necessary to ensure effective progress in implementing structural reforms and make auditors reports available to the Fund, World Bank and Asian Development Bank.	As necessary
Submit to Parliament draft law on competition policy.	December 31, 1998	Already under discussion in Parliament.

¹Primary responsibility between institutions are as follows: monetary and exchange rate policy—IMF; fiscal policy—IMF; bank restructuring—IMF/World Bank/AsDB; corporate debt restructuring—IMF/World Bank; trade policy and trade financing—World Bank; real sector structural reforms, privatization, and environment—World Bank/AsDB; social safety net—World Bank/AsDB; food security—World Bank; small and medium-size enterprises—AsDB; audits of state enterprises—World Bank.
²Excludes commitments that were both scheduled for completion and actually completed by September 30, 1998.